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From April 30 to May 3, 1992 Los Angeles erupted in riots causing untold 
damage in financial and human terms, as most of America watched horrified. The 
following year a car bomb exploded in the parking garage of the World Trade Center 
resulting in the death of six people, leaving more than 1,000 injured, and causing in 
excess of half a billion dollars damage (Blumenthal, 1993). And in quite possibly the 
worst terrorist attack ever on US soil, on April 19, 1995, terrorists bombed the Federal 
building in Oklahoma City causing the death of more than 160 people. In the past it was 
commonly thought that domestic political violence was something confined to far off 
places such as Northern Ireland or Israel, but increasingly Americans find that this is no 
longer the case. 
What causes domestic political violence? Riots, domestic terrorism, 
assassinations, and other forms of domestic violence are all acts that affect everyone 
within a country. If the violence does not directly affect the general population, it is often 
indirectly affected by the laws and restrictions which governments employ to suppress 
the violence (Combs, 1997). 
This paper compares two of the more prominent theories that explain the causes 
of domestic political violence: the older more established relative deprivation theory, and 
the much newer rational action theory. Deprivation theory remains the most prominent 
theory in the field, but rational action theory presents a formidable challenge. The 
following section places these two theories in the broader literature on domestic political 
violence. The next section presents the research design, including the operationalization, 
measurement, and specification of the models. The final section presents the analysis and 
conclusions from the models. 
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Literature Review 
There exists a rich literature on domestic political violence (Combs, 1997; Gurr 
1968; Gurr 1970; Tilly 1978; Thompson 1989; White and White, 1993). In fact, research 
on domestic political violence is coincidental with the study ofpolitics. Aristotle and 
other early social philosophers postulated that the underlying cause of domestic political 
violence is economic inequality (Muller, 1985). Muller (1985) refers to this as the 
classical hypothesis, which was best articulated by De Tocqueville when he wrote, 
"Almost all ofthe revolutions which have changed the aspects of nations have been made 
to consolidate or to destroy social inequality ([ 1835] 1961)." 
The traditional elegance of the classical hypothesis does not stand up to empirical 
scrutiny, for vast inequalities persist in many countries without significant violence. 
Hence, more recent studies focus more on the level of economic development as the 
primary explanatory variable of domestic political violence. Sigelman and Simpson 
(1977) found in their study that the level of economic development was a strong predictor 
of domestic political violence. They proposed that greater levels of violence are much 
more likely in less developed countries. 
The resource mobilization school of thought takes a different tack in trying to 
explain domestic political violence. They argue that groups must have the means to 
foment domestic political violence. More specifically a dissident group must be able to 
acquire the resources needed to obtain the desired goal (Gamson, 1975; Jenkins and 
Perrow, 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978). For example, Tilly (1978) postulated that 
with adequate resources dissident groups would respond with violence when the 
government responds to protest activity with repression. These resources include among 
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others: availability of recruits, access to anns, and availability ofmoney. Unfortunately, 
the difficulties of operationalizing this theory makes it practically impossible to test. 
Deprivation Theory: 
Probably the largest and most dominant area ofliterature dealing with domestic 
political violence is an offshoot ofthe classical hypothesis, relative deprivation theory. 
Ted Robert Gurr first tested relative deprivation in his 1968 paper, "A Causal Model of 
Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices." He later fully elaborates a 
more complete model of relative deprivation in his landmark book Why Men Rebel. 
Gurr's work on relative deprivation is the indisputable benchmark in the field. Both the 
large numbers of papers that cite and use Gurr's ideas, and the considerable amount of 
empirical research demonstrates its importance (Henderson 1991; Muller and Weede, 
1990; Muller, 1985; Ross, 1993; Sigelman and Simpson, 1977; Thompson, 1989; White 
and White, 1993). 
Gurr (1970) defines relative deprivation as "the actor's perception of the 
discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities." Relative 
deprivation, then, is the difference between the goods and conditions to which people 
believe they are entitled, and those they think they are actually able to achieve. 
According to the theory, an affluent group may perceive itself as deprived if it feels that it 
should live in better conditions. Conversely, a group living in horrible conditions may in 
fact not experience a high degree of relative deprivation. 
Gurr points to an indirect relationship between relative deprivation and violence. 
Relative deprivation leads to violence through what Gurr refers to as the deprivation­
frustration-aggression (DFA) linkage. Relative deprivation causes frustration within a 
country's entire population, or (more likely) a segment of the population. This, in tum, 
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manifests itself in the fonn ofviolence (Gurr 1970). 
Rational Action Theory: 
While relative deprivation theory provides a compelling explanation of domestic 
political violence, rational action theory explains that individuals calculate costs and 
benefits of rebellion and political violence (Muller and Weede, 1990; Muller, 1985; 
Muller and Seligson, 1987). If the costs ofviolence are too large, or if the opportunity 
for the achievement of their goals through peaceful means is likely, they will choose not 
to rebel. Rational action theory measures these costs as a function of regime 
repressiveness (Muller and Weede, 1990). This study uses Muller and Weede's (1990) 
study as the general outline for the rational action model. It is important to note that 
Muller and Weede (1990) make several assumptions about an individual's rational action 
calculus. These assumptions include: "(a) when repression is high, the expected benefits 
of either rebellion or peaceful collective action will be relatively low because ofhigh 
costs and low expectations of success; (b) when repression is low, the expected benefits 
of rebellion will be exceeded by the expected benefits of peaceful collective action; but 
(c) when repression is intennediate, the expected benefits of rebellion will exceed those 
ofpeaceful collective action." 
Rational action theory hypothesizes that at low levels of regime repressiveness 
individuals will find it in their best interest not to use violence because their goals are 
better achieved through peaceful means. At high levels of repression individuals will 
find the costs of violence too high compared to the benefits, and therefore will not rebel. 
It is difficult to imagine the rioting or terrorist activity that took place in the twilight of 
the Soviet Union occurring during Stalin's rule. The area where rational action theory 
does predict a high level ofviolence is at the intennediate levels of regime 
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repreSSIveness. At these levels the costs of violence are not sufficiently high to deter its 
use, and the individual usually does not see a peaceful method as a realistic means to 
achieve their goals. Based on rational action theory the relationship between domestic 
political violence and the amount of regime repressiveness should be in the form of an 
inverted V-curve (as seen below). 
Domestic Political 
Violence 
Regime Repressiveness 
Northern Ireland is a perfect example of a state that has this intermediate level of 
regime repressiveness. Many of the Catholic minority feel that living under British rule 
is no longer a viable option. They feel that their rights in the past were infringed upon, 
and that as a minority group they cannot attain their goals through democratic means. 
Thus several factions in the Catholic minority turned to violence by participation in such 
groups as the P.I.R.A. The reaction of the British is typical of a government where an 
intermediate level of violence exists. Beyond creating or allowing for the initial 
atmosphere that precipitated the violence, the security forces in turn responded by more 
repression. The level of repression applied by the British Government has not been 
enough to quell the violence, but in fact has probably made the violence worse 
(Thompson, 1989; White and White, 1995). 
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Research Design 
As stated earlier this study compares two theories that focus on different variables 
when trying to explain why levels ofdomestic political violence vary between countries. 
This study uses a statistical method of analysis, including regression analysis, because it 
allows for greater confidence that the results are not in some way biased in the case 
selection process. The statistical method also allows for a comparison between the 
variance explained by each model, which allows a comparison of the two theories. 
The unit of analysis in this study, as in most quantitative studies seeking 
explanations ofdifferent rates of domestic political violence between countries, is the 
state (Dixon and Moon, 1989; Gurr, 1968; Muller, 1985; Muller and Weede 1990; Weede 
1981). Both the independent and dependent variables are aggregate numbers taken at the 
national level. This particular study uses 96 separate countries, which constitutes the 
universe of case for which data are available. The population of 96 nations used in this 
study is large and geographically varied enough that it allows for large degree of 
confidence in the significance of the results. The specific break down of countries is as 
follows: 22 countries from North and South America, 21 countries from Europe, 27 
African counties, 10 Middle Eastern countries, and 16 from Asia. In other words, the 
large "N" of this study should assuage fears that the results are not in some way due to 
either a biased selection of cases or a statistical anomal/ . 
The dependent variable for each regression is the log of the death rate for 
domestic political violence that occurs in each country. The source for the raw data is the 
World Handbook ofPolitical and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). This 
I For a complete list of the counties used in this study see Appendix A. 
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measure suffers from less reporting bias then other measures of domestic political 
violence, such as: assassinations, deaths caused by armed attacks, or composite indexes 
(Muller, 1985; Muller and Weede, 1990; and Weede, 1981). The logarithmic 
transformation of the dependent variable smoothes out many of the outliers, giving a 
more representative dependent variable for the regressions (Muller, 1985). Because a 
different regression tests both deprivation and rational action theory each has separate 
independent variables, which are operationalized by different means. 
Rational Action Theory: 
The independent variables for rational action theory are regime repressiveness, 
and the square of regime repressiveness, and the specific rational action theory 
hypotheses are: 
HI People will resort to domestic political violence when the benefits of violence 
outweigh the costs. 
H 2 An increase in domestic political violence has an inverted "U" effect on domestic 
political violence (Muller and Weede 1990). 
This study operationalizes regime repressiveness by using the ratings of political 
rights and civil liberties provided by Raymond Gastil (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). This 
variable is the average of the numerical value of political right and civil liberties in each 
country for the years 1973-1977. Gastil's measure ranges from a low of 1.0 to a high of 
7.0. This means that a state with a very low score has a low level of regime 
repressiveness (a range of 1-2.49). A country with a score between 2.5-5.5 is semi-
repressive, and a country with a score between 5.5-7.0 has a highly repressive regime 
(Muller and Weede, 1990). 
This study uses the square of the regime repressiveness variable because it makes 
9 
it possible to test for the inverted "U" relationship hypothesized by rational action theory 
using ordinary least squares regression (OLS). OLS regressions predict how well an 
independent variable explains a straight line through the data. However, rational action 
theory predicts a nonmonotonic relationship. It is possible to show this relationship using 
standard OLS regressions by running the independent variable and its square. If the 
coefficient for the regular independent variable is positive, and its squared term negative, 
then the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable is in 
the form of an inverted "U" (Muller and Weede, 1990). This is the relationship looked 
for in this study. 
Relative Deprivation Theory: 
The independent variables for the model testing relative deprivation theory are 
from Ourr's 1972 data for his study, "A Causal Model ofCivil Strife." These variables 
measure the amount of relative deprivation in a country and by dividing deprivation into 
persistent and short-term. The specific relative deprivation hypotheses tested in this 
study are: 
H3 The greater the level of deprivation in a country, the greater level of frustration, which 
leads to a higher level of domestic political violence (OUIT 1970). 
H 4 Increases in persistent deprivation lead to increases in the level of domestic political 
violence within countries (OUIT 1972). 
H s Increases in short-term political deprivation lead to increases level of domestic 
political violence within countries (OUIT 1972). 
H6 Increases in short-term economic deprivation lead to increases in the level of domestic 
political violence within countries (OUIT 1972). 
The persistent deprivation variable is a weighted average of six measures of 
conditions that OUIT (1972) describes as common and relatively unchanging sources of 
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deprivation. These six measures include: (1) economic deprivation, (2) political 
discrimination, (3) potential separatism, (4) dependence on foreign capital, (5) religious 
cleavages, and (6) lack of educational opportunities. 
Gurr (1972) also includes short-term deprivation variables, which he describes as 
measures on a priori grounds as common sources of deprivation susceptible to short-run 
change, compared to those he classified as long-run persistent deprivation. This study 
includes the short-term variables because they allow a comparison between short and 
long-term deprivation in predicting levels of domestic political violence. The variable for 
short-term economic deprivation created by Gurr (1972) is a weighted average of five 
separate measures. These measures include: (1) Short-term relative declines in total 
value of foreign trade, 1957-1960 compared with the 1950-75 base; (2) Short-term 
relative declines in total value of foreign trade, 1960-1965 compared with the 1950-1960 
base; (3) Relative increases in inflation rates, 1960-1963 compared with 1958-1961; (4) 
Relative decreases in GNP growth rates, 1960-1963 change compared with a 1950's bas~ 
period; (5) Economic adversity 1960-63 (estimates of the extent and intensity of specified 
types of adverse internal economic conditions). 
The final independent variable tested in the deprivation model is short-term 
political deprivation. This is a weighted average of two measures of short-term political 
deprivation: (1) New restrictions on political participation and representation 1960-1963, 
(2) New value-depriving policies of governments 1960-1963 (Gurr, 1972). 
Table 1 
Independent Variables Tested 
Rational Action Theory: 
Regime Repressiveness 
Regime Repressiveness Squared 
Deprivation Theory: 
Persistent Deprivation 
Short-term Economic Deprivation 
Short-term Political Deprivation 
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As has already been noted, this study uses old data. There are, however, several 
justifications. The first and most important is that these theories test hypothesized levels 
of violence for given conditions, and as such there is no reason to believe they are 
temporally bound. This study assumes, (ceteris paribus), that the propensity for political 
violence remains constant. 
There are also several more practical reasons for the use of older data. The first 
is that the older data are easier to obtain. These data are also accepted and have been 
used in previous research (Gurr, 1968; Muller, 1985; Muller and Weede, 1990; Sigelman 
and Simpson, 1977; Weede, 1981). Another reason for the use of older data is due to the 
independent variables for the deprivation model. By using independent variables 
constructed and specified by Gurr (1972) it becomes possible to not only to test 
deprivation theory using unbiased measures, but also use a level of sophistication in the 
independent variables that would have otherwise been far outside the scope ofthis study. 
To reap these benefits it is necessary to use the older 1960's data. 
The use of Gurr's induces does not in any way mean that this study was simply a 
repeat of Gurr's 1972 study. The purpose of this study is to independently test 
deprivation and rational action theories, and then compare the results in the hopes of 
determining which theory best explains why countries experience domestic political 
violence. While it is certainly true that this study creates no new theories the work it does 
in testing and comparing the two theories is important. 
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Analysis 
Rational Action Theory: 
This section first tests rational action theory with some encouraging results. A 
simple means test compares the difference between the average number of deaths per 
million caused by domestic political violence for each of the three levels of regime 
repressiveness. If rational action theory holds, we would expect to find the average 
deaths per million for states classified as having a low level of repression to also have a 
low average. A state classified as a semi-repressive regime should have a higher average 
number of deaths per million caused by domestic political violence, than states with low 
levels of repression. Finally, rational action theory predicts that states classified as highly 
repressive have a lower average than semi-repressive states. 
In this study, the data supports the predictions made by rational action theory. 
The average for states in the low regime repressiveness category was .52 deaths caused 
by domestic political violence per million of population. This average increases to 2.21 
deaths per million for semi-repressive regimes, and then drops back down to .83 deaths 
per million for highly repressive regimes. 
Bolstered by the results from the average number of deaths per million, regression 
analysis was used to further test the rational action hypothesis. The results of this model 
are in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
2
RatlOnaIA'ctlon Theorv 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Log of Deaths 
Independent
 
Variables:
 
Regime 9.06
 
Repressiveness (.0025)
 
Regime -1.32
LRepressiveness (.0025) 
Squared 
Intercept -16.77 
I 
(.0006) 
Adiusted R" .13030 
Number of Cases 92 
Note: In the above table the top number for the independent variables is the coefficient, and the 
bottom number in parentheses is its significance ofT value. 
The results of the model testing rational action theory using the log of domestic. 
political violence as the dependent variable are supportive of the theory. Both of the 
independent variables have values for their significance ofT that are well below the .05 
level, demonstrating that the variables are significant. Therefore, the T values are low 
2 
enough to reject the null hypothesis that no relationship exists. The adjusted R for this 
2 
model is also quite good. An adjusted R of .13 means that the independent variables 
explain almost 13 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. It is important to 
2 
note that while an adjusted R of.13 may not seem high, it is comparable to Muller and 
2 2 
Weede's (1990) adjusted R of .16. Although lower than Muller's (1985) adjusted R of 
2 Note for the model testing rational action theory four counties had numbers for deaths per million that 
were extreme even after the log was taken. These countries are thrown out as outliers. 
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.24, however Muller (1985) uses a much smaller sample than the one used in this study. 
Probably the most interesting aspect of this model is that it directly supports 
rational action theory's inverted V-curve hypothesis. Notice that the coefficient for the 
regime repressiveness variable is positive, while the coefficient for the square of regime 
repressiveness is negative. These findings conform to an inverted V-curve relationship 
between regime repressiveness and the log of the death rate per million caused by 
domestic political violence, and therefore support the hypothesis put forward by rational 
action theory. 
Relative Deprivation Theory: 
The next theory tested is relative deprivation theory. The model testing this 
theory contained persistent deprivation, short-term economic deprivation, and short-term 
political deprivation, as the independent variables. Because of the larger number of 
variables this study began with bivariate correlations as a "first cut" at testing their 
relationship with political violence. The results are in table 3. 
Table 3 
Correlation Coefficients for Deprivation Theory Variables 
Persistent Deprivation 
Log of Deaths 
.2680 
P=.086 
Short-tenn Economic 
Deprivation 
.1880 
P=.233 
Short-tenn Political Deprivation .3466 
P=.025 
Note: The number on top is the coefficient, and the significance level is tested using a two-tailed test. 
The bivariate analysis demonstrates the explanatory power of each variable, and 
justify their inclusion in a multivariate model. Short-term economic deprivation is 
statistically insignificant at the .1 level, but both persistent and short-term political 
deprivation are both significant at the .1 level. The correlation coefficients for the 
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significant variables (.27 for persistent deprivation, and .36 for short-tenn political 
deprivation) are correlated in the manner predicted by relative deprivation theory. As 
both short-tenn and persistent deprivation are significant at the .1 level these variables are 
the independent variables for the model testing deprivation theory. The results of the 
model testing deprivation theory are in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Relative Deprivation Theory 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Deaths per 
Million 
Independent 
Variables: 
Persisting .0147 
Deprivation (.0895) 
Short-term Economic NA 
Deprivation 
Short-term Political .0124 
Deprivation (.0262) 
Intercept -1.025 
(.0666) 
Adjusted R" .1417 
Number of Cases 96 
Note: In the table above for the independent variables the top number is its coefficient, and the 
bottom number in parenthesis is its significance of T value. 
Both independent variables in this model remain significant, and the coefficients 
are positive, as deprivation theory would predict. The model also shows that an increase 
in either short-tenn political or persistent deprivation wi11lead to an increase in domestic 
political violence. This is exactly the relationship hypothesized by deprivation theory. 
With both short-tenn political and persistent deprivation as the independent variables the 
model has an adjusted R2 of .14. Using the more stringent .05 test for significance levels, 
persistent deprivation drops out, and a regression run using only short-tenn political 
2deprivation yields an R of .1 O. 
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It is important to note that although short-tenn political deprivation is the most 
statistically significant deprivation variable, bivariate correlations show that all of the 
deprivation variables are highly correlated. These results are predictable as all of the 
deprivation variables are ostensibly measuring the same thing, relative deprivation. Thus 
while the deprivation variables are admittedly correlated, short-tenn domestic political 
violence seems to be the most important deprivation indicator in explaining domestic 
political violence. 
This study's adjusted R2 is not as high as the R2 of .36 Gurr (1968) found in his 
original study testing relative deprivation. It is unclear why this study has a lower R2 
than Gurr's (1968) study testing the same variables. One possible explanation is that 
Gurr's use of a different dependent variable yielded better results. However if this study 
had used the dependent variable employed by Gurr (1968) it makes the two models tested 
much less comparable, thus this study uses the same dependent variable for each model. 
Conclusions 
The regression analysis yielded mixed results. Both models are statistically 
significant, with each explaining from 13-14 percent of the variance in domestic political 
violence. An R2 of .14 is not explaining the majority of the variance in domestic political 
violence to be sure, but the models do show that both theories are important in accounting 
for at least some of the variance. Considering that the purpose of each model was to test 
only one main hypothesis, 14 percent ofthe variance is quite respectable. 
While the results for each model are good, they are also somewhat disappointing. 
The purpose of this paper is to test and compare two competing theories. The results 
showed however that each theory did a remarkably equal job in explaining the variance in 
17 
domestic political violence between countries. Because the results are so similar, it is 
impossible to say that one theory is "better" than the other. 
One possible explanation for the similarities between the results of the two 
models may be due to a correlation between levels of regime repressiveness and relative 
deprivation. It is quite possible that when people calculate the costs and benefits of 
political violence that they take into account levels of deprivation. This study tests this 
idea by running a correlation coefficient between the independent variables in each 
model. The results support the idea that a relationship exists. Regime repressiveness 
from the rational action model, and persistent deprivation from the relative deprivation 
model, are somewhat correlated with a coefficient of .4275, significant to the .000 level. 
However, the two short-term deprivation variables are not correlated with regime 
repressiveness. It appears that the relationship between the rational action theory and 
relative deprivation theory is another area for future research. 
As both the models explain approximately 14 percent of the variance, it also 
shows that neither theory by itself explains the majority of the variance. The literature of 
this field may help explain why neither theory provides a definitive answer to the 
question of the causes of domestic political violence. It seems that the answer may 
simply be too complicated to explain using only one theory. This is probably why there 
are so many different competing theories and ideas in the field of domestic political 
violence. Results from this study indicate that deprivation and cost-benefit thinking are 
involved in why people rebel, but there are certainly other reasons. The literature in the 
domestic violence field also points to income inequality, economic development, and 
resource mobilization, as just a few of the other factors involving in the decision making 
•
 
18 
process. Because the literature points to so many factors future research including a 
multi-causal model is appropriate. 
The study of domestic political violence is as an important area of research now, 
as it was thirty years ago. The purpose of this study was to fill a very small niche in that 
field. Of course, more work testing both deprivation and rational action theories is 
desirable, preferably using more sophisticated research tools. One specific area of 
improvement would be to use survey data to test deprivation theory. This is because 
survey data would do a better job getting at how people "feel" than the empirical 
measures used in this and previous studiel 
3 See appendix B. 
•
 
19 
References 
Blumenthal, Ralph. 1993, Oct. 28. Tapes Depict Proposal to thwart Bomb Used in Trade 
Center Blast. New York Times. 
Combs, Cindy. 1997. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Dixon, William 1. and William Moon. 1989. Domestic Political Conflict and Basic 
Needs Outcomes. Comparative Political Studies 22: 178-198 
Gamson, William A. 1975. The Strategy ofSocial Protest. Homewood, IL: Dorsey 
Gurr, Robert Ted. 1968. A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparison Analysis Using 
New Indices. American Political Science Review 62:1104-24 
Gurr, Robert Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gurr, Robert Ted. 1972. A Causal Model ofCivil Strife. Ann Arbor, MI: ICPSR 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1994. World Values Survey, 1981-1984 and 1990-1993. Ann Arbor, 
MI: ICPSR 
Jenkins, Joseph Craig and Charles Perrow. 1977. Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm 
Worker Movements (1946-1972). American Sociological Review. 42 :248-68 
Muller, Edward N. 1985. Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political 
Violence. American Sociological Review 50:47-61. 
Muller, Edward N. and Erich Weede. 1990.Cross-National Variation in Political 
Violence: A Rational Action Approach. Journal ofConflict Resolution 34:624-51. 
Oberschall, Anthony. 1973. Social Conflicts and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Ross, Jeffery Ian. 1993. Structural Causes ofOppositional Political Terrorism: Towards 
a Causal Model. Journal ofPeace Research 30: 317-329. 
Sigelman, Lee and Miles Simpson. 1977. A Cross-National Test of the Linkage between 
Economic Inequality and Political Violence. Journal ofConflict Resolution 
21:105-28. 
Taylor, Charles Lewis, and David A. Jodice. 1983a, 1983b. World Handbook of Political 
rd
and Social Indicators, vols 1 and 2. 3 ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
•
 
20 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. [1835] 1961. Democracy in America, Volume II. New York: 
Schocken Books. 
Thompson, J.L.P. 1989. Deprivation and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1922­
1985. Journal ofConflict Resolution 33 :676-699. 
Wang, T.Y. 1993. Inequality and Political Violence Revisited. American Political 
Science Review 87:979-983. 
White, Robert W. and Terry White. 1995. Repression and the Liberal State: The Case of 
Northern Ireland, 1969-1972. Journal ofConflict Resolution 39:330-352. 
•
 
21 
Appendix A 
United States Poland Ethiopia* 
Canada Austria Angola* 
Cuba Hungary Mozambique* 
Haiti Czechoslovakia Zambia 
Dominican Republic Italy Malawi 
Jamaica Yugoslavia South Africa 
Mexico Greece Morocco 
Guatemala Bulgaria Algeria 
Honduras Romania Tunisia 
EI Salvador USSR Libya 
Nicaragua Finland Sudan 
Costa Rica Sweden Iran 
Panama Norway Turkey 
Colombia Denmark Iraq 
Venezuela Senegal Egypt 
Ecuador Niger Syria 
Peru Ivory Coast Lebanon 
Brazil Guinea Israel 
Paraguay Liberia Saudi Arabia 
Chile Sierra Leone Yemen Arab Republic 
Argentina Ghana United Arab Emirates 
Uruguay Togo Afghanistan 
United Kingdom Cameroon People's Republic of 
Ireland Nigeria China 
The Netherlands Central Africa Republic Japan 
Belgium Chad India 
France Congo Pakistan 
Federal Republic of Uganda* Burma 
Germany Kenya Nepal 
German Democratic Burundi Thailand 
Republic of Somalia 
South Vietnam 
Singapore 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Australia 
New Guinea 
New Zealand 
Note: The starred countries were not included in the rational action model. 
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Appendix B 
According to T. Y. Wang (1993) the lack of the use of survey data in the field of 
domestic political violence is a large gap in the field. This study attempted to use survey 
data to test deprivation theory, with The World Values Survey (1994) as a possible 
source for data to fill this empirical gap. 
Questions such as, "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as 
a whole? Please answer 1-10," appear to get past the problem of measuring how people 
feel. After finding suitable questions the problem became finding data for the dependent 
variable deaths caused by domestic political violence. The World Values Survey (1994) 
uses two different samples one taken from 1981-1984, and the other from 1990-1993. 
The data for deaths caused by domestic political from Taylor and Jodice only goes 
through 1982, and more recent data are not available. Therefore to use The World 
Values Survey one is forced to choose the older sample. 
The problems arise from the both the size and scope of this sample. The sample' 
includes only 22 countries making regression and more sophisticated analysis impossible. 
The more important problem sterns from the countries included in the 1981-1984 sample. 
Most of the countries in the sample are either Western European or North American, and 
according to Taylor and Jodice the only deaths caused by domestic political violence in 
those countries during or directly before the survey were in the US. This effectively 
negates the dependent variable making any type of statistical analysis impossible. So 
after a lot of effort it was found that indeed the use of survey data is needed to test 
deprivation, but at this time it is impossible to do this type of work on the statistical level. 
